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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-18a-l(l) and §78-2a-3(2)(d) 
(1992). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Was defendant's trial counsel's performance properly based on strategy and appropriate 
defense tactics? 
Where ineffective assistance of counsel claims are first raised on direct appeal, the issue is 
reviewed as a matter of law. State v. Tennvson, 850 P.2d 461, 466 (Utah App. 1993). Such 
review however, is highly deferential, to avoid the distortions of hindsight and second guessing 
counsel's performance based on the inanimate record. Id. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The text of the constitutional provisions, statutes and rules upon which the respondent 
relies is set out in Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant Ernie Young was convicted of the crime of battery, under Section 11.08.020, 
Salt Lake City Ordinances. Defendant was convicted by a jury, the Honorable Sheila K. 
McCleve presiding. 
On September 27, 1993, Defendant Ernie Young and his girlfriend Karen Cadman were 
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observed fighting at approximately 450 South 700 East. (Trial transcript page 8) (hereinafter T.) 
Defendant previously began fighting with Karen at her home, when she put too much meat in his 
taco. (T. 27) Karen testified that Ernie was being "mean" and so she left, and had been walking 
along 700 East when defendant caught up with her and the battery was observed. (T. 27) During 
the course of their argument, defendant held Karen to the ground, and struck her in the face and 
stomach. (T. 8-10) 
After the approach of a third person, defendant turned and walked away, while Karen 
went in the opposite direction, accompanied by the third party. (T. 11, 32) Officer Mark Gross 
responded to a dispatch call, and searched the area for a man or woman meeting defendant's or 
Karen's description. (T. 19) Officer Gross found Karen Cadman, talking with a man who said he 
had witnessed the incident. (T. 19) Karen told Officer Gross that Ernie had struck her after a 
fight, and accepted a ride home from Officer Gross. At the home, Karen asked Officer Gross to 
help her get in, as Ernie had the keys, and to look for Ernie because she was afraid he would 
comeback. (T. 20) 
Amanda Smith, the FendalTs employee who called police and described the incident to 
Officer Gross, did not change her story regarding the events which occurred. Amanda stated she 
had seen a man "beating his wife or girlfriend." (T. 8). Although on the day of the battery, Karen 
told Officer Gross that Ernie had struggled with her and thrown her to the ground, and that she 
was afraid or him, at trial Karen testified that Ernie was merely attempting to help calm her down, 
and help her from sitting in glass. (T. 28) Karen further claimed both that in attempting to get 
her to come home, Ernie had turned her around, and that she had turned around herself, 
voluntarily. (T. 29) 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Ernie Young was convicted of battery at a jury trial. Counsel's performance, however, 
was not constitutionally ineffective simply because it did not produce the desired result. 
Ernie Young cannot meet either prong of the constitutional test, as he cannot show 
ineffectiveness or prejudice. Trial counsel's decision to not attempt to bring in a witness whose 
testimony would be favorable to the prosecution cannot be considered poor performance, but 
rather must be viewed as an exercise of trial strategy. Additionally, failure to present a doctor to 
testify about a victim's state of mind cannot constitute unreasonable performance, given the 
attenuated relevancy from the issues at trial. Defense counsel's decision not have her client testify 
should be viewed as a trial tactic, by which she could ensure that no mention of defendant's prior 
felony conviction would come before the jury. Further, the defense strategy of not objecting to 
hearsay testimony should be viewed as a defense choice, by which counsel could herself cross 
examine regarding those statements and then offer contradictory testimony by way of rebuttal. 
No prejudice is evident in this case. Ernie Young was convicted by jurors, sitting as the 
triers of fact, who had the opportunity to evaluate the credibility of all the witnesses, particularly 
the victim. The testimony of an independent eyewitness was presented, and was in stark contrast 
to the self contradictory victim. Adding the testimony of Salt Lake City Police Officer Mark 
Gross, which corroborates the uninvolved witness' testimony and some of the victim's statements 
made on the date of the battery, the jury's verdict was well supported by the evidence. No 
reasonable likelihood exists that absent any alleged errors, the verdict would be favorable to the 
defendant. 
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ARGUMENT 
DEFENDANT'S TRIAL COUNSEL WAS NOT INEFFECTIVE, AND 
DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION SHOULD THEREFORE BE AFFIRMED. 
A. Defense counsel's performance met an objective standard of 
reasonableness, thus her performance was constitutionally effective. 
Criminal defendants are entitled to the effective assistance of trial counsel. Strickland v. 
Washington. 466 U.S. 668 (1984). In post conviction proceedings, Utah courts review 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims with a presumption that counsel made decisions as part of 
their trial strategy. State v. Templin 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990). Trial decisions will not be 
deemed to be deficient performance unless the defendant persuades a court that no conceivable 
tactical basis existed for counsel's actions. State v. Moritzky. 771 P.2d 688 (Utah App. 1989). In 
making this determination, the reviewing court need not know counsel's strategy, nor approve of 
it, but must simply be able to articulate a plausible basis for counsel's decision. State v. Tennyson. 
850 P.2d 461, 467 (Utah App. 1993) (citations omitted). 
Defendant here alleges various errors, such as trial counsel's failure to present testimony 
from other witnesses, failure to object to the prosecution's questions, and refusing to let the 
defendant testify at trial. Even assuming defendant's allegations are true, he fails to sustain the 
burden of showing that these were not and could not have been trial tactics. This defendant 
cannot do. 
On appeal, defendant makes much of counsel's failure to perform an adequate 
investigation. Utah cases address such issues in State v. Tyler, 850 P.2d 1250 (Utah 1993), and 
State v. Callahan 866 P.2d 590 (Utah App. 1993), relied upon by defendant. Defendant fails to 
show how more investigation would produce different results. Counsel was sent the police report 
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in discovery, containing information about the witness Sky Davini. It is reasonable for this Court 
to believe that the decision not to focus on Davini as a witness stemmed from the information 
found in the police report and from Officer Gross himself. 
At trial, counsel did not object to hearsay testimony regarding the statements of Davini to 
Officer Gross, and then cross examined the witness on that topic. When the defense called Karen 
Cadman, that witness was also questioned about the hearsay statements of Davini, and she 
contradicted Officer Gross. Counsel obviously presented that testimony with the hope that 
conflicts would be resolved in favor of defendant. Courts should not uphold ineffective assistance 
claims where counsel fails to object and then attempts to use the same evidence. "It is well 
established that trial tactics and strategies including what witnesses to call, what objections to 
make, and by and large what defenses to put forth are generally within the prerogative of counsel 
and are generally left to counsel's professional judgment." State v. Tylen 850 P.2d at 1256. 
Here, appellate counsel claims that trial counsel's failure to investigate and subpoena an 
eyewitness constitutes ineffectiveness. Counsel relies on an unsworn, handwritten affidavit, 
submitted by defendant himself rather than by counsel, which flatly contradicts evidence available 
to trial counsel in the police report. If indeed this extra record evidence were able to be 
considered by this Court, the appropriate method would be by request for a new trial based on 
new evidence, not by submitting the unsworn statement and treating it as evidence. Should this 
Court feel compelled to review such evidence, it may wish to take judicial notice of the fact that 
the "sworn affidavit of Sky Davini" bears remarkable resemblance to the handwriting of Ernie 
Young, apparent from the many handwritten motions filed upon this Court. 
Defense counsel is also alleged to have been ineffective in failing to present Karen 
5 
Cadman's doctor to testify about the victim's anxiety attacks. Defendant presents no case law to 
support the proposition that failure to produce irrelevant evidence constitutes ineffective 
assistance of counsel. Karen Cadman testified that she had anxiety attacks, and that Ernie was 
attempting to calm her down. Further evidence about the victim's condition was not relevant to 
any trial issue, as no facts ever put the victim's conduct or state of mind at issue. The jury would 
be able to weigh that claim of Karen's anxiety against the facts regarding a fight about defendant's 
dinner, defendant following Karen, that they yelled at each other, and that an independent person 
would view their behavior as a beating. 
Defendant further claims that he was not allowed to testify. It is entirely possible that trial 
counsel made an evaluation as to defendant's credibility as a witness, perhaps looking at his 
personality, demeanor, or temper, and determined that he would not be able to add to his case. 
Or, counsel could have determined that defendant's testimony would have been duplicative of 
Karen's, while risking the possibility that his felony conviction may come before the jury. 
Appellate counsel conveniently ignores a Utah case on point, State v. Morehouse. 748 P.2d 217 
(Utah App. 1988). In Morehouse, a defendant's counsel misunderstood Utah Rule of Evidence 
609 regarding admissibility of prior felony convictions, and on that basis determined not to have 
the defendant testify. This Court held that such conduct was not ineffective assistance of counsel, 
finding that choice to be the legitimate exercise of trial tactics. 
Additionally, counsel here submitted a proposed jury instruction regarding the defendant's 
right to not testify, and the proper inferences to be drawn by the jury. (See Defendant's proposed 
jury instructions, Record page 46). It is anomalous to say that defendant's exercise of his 
constitutional right not to testify, regarding which the jury was instructed, can also be a source of 
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error where the trial verdict is unfavorable. 
B. Defendant cannot show prejudice from any alleged errors. 
Even if any of counsel's tactics were deemed harmful, defendant must still meet his burden 
of showing prejudice. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 694, State v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d at 
467. Despite any of counsel's alleged errors, the evidence overwhelmingly supports the jury's 
verdict. 
Amanda Smith, an employed, seventeen year old high school student, testified that she 
observed a battery in progress. She believed enough in what she saw that she immediately 
reported the incident, talked with the investigating officer, and came to court to testify about the 
incident. The jury was able to evaluate her demeanor and appearance, and to judge her 
credibility. Amanda was never impeached regarding her ability to observe the event, or her ability 
to remember it, or the strength of her belief in what she viewed. Amanda had no relationship with 
either the defendant or the victim, and had no ulterior motive affecting her testimony, as did the 
victim. 
Amanda's testimony was contrasted with Karen Cadman's, who had changed her story, 
and maintained a continuing relationship with the defendant. Karen attempted to take 
responsibility for the incident, claiming that her anxiety was the cause, and that Ernie was merely 
attempting to "help" her. Karen's testimony had various inconsistencies, such as accepting a ride 
home from Officer Gross although she told Ernie she would go to her Grandma's, and despite her 
trial testimony that she was not afraid of Ernie. Karen claimed that Ernie had turned her around, 
and also that she turned herself. Karen claimed the incident was due to her problems, but never 
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offered any evidence that she had struck out at Ernie, or described any behavior on her part to 
explain what Amanda had viewed 
Officer Gross's testimony corroborated Amanda's testimony and parts of Karen's The 
hearsay evidence regarding Sky Davini presented the jury with two potential conclusions that 
Davini had corroborated Amanda Smiths's description, or that Davini said to Officer Gross that he 
saw the incident and Ernie did not hit Karen The jury evidently resolved this conflict in the 
evidence by believing Amanda Smith and Officer Gross 
Defendant never effectively demonstrates prejudice from counsel's alleged errors 
Defendant has failed to show that but for counsel's errors, the result would be different Even if 
defendant's counsel were perfect, she would have had to overcome the effectiveness of an 
independent and apparently highly credible eyewitness Without meeting the burden of 
demonstrating prejudice, defendant's appeal must fail 
C. If the record is inadequate, the proper remedy is remand for an evidentiary 
hearing 
Defendant alleges no facts in support of his claim that he wished to testify and trial counsel 
refused If this Court rules that without evidence of trial counsel's reasoning in determining 
whether or not to have Ernie testify, it cannot decide the question, the proper resolution would be 
to remand for an evidentiary hearing, pursuant to Rule 23B, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
In reviewing this question, this Court should not remand the case back for a "fishing expedition " 
State v Garrett 849 P 2d 578, 581-82 (Utah App 1993) As this Court noted in Garrett, the 
Rule 23B remedy is available only on upon an allegation of facts in support of the ineffective 
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assistance claim, with proof as a demonstrative reality and not as a speculative claim. Id, citing 
State v.McNicoL 554 P.2d 203 (Utah 1976). 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant cannot meet the two pronged test to show ineffective assistance of counsel. All 
of defendant's complaints regarding his trial counsel's performance address trial tactics, which will 
not be second guessed by reviewing courts. Counsel's defense strategy was objectively 
reasonable, and cannot be challenged simply because it was not successful. 
Further, Defendant fails to show prejudice. Defendant was convicted by a jury well able 
to evaluate the efficacy of his defense, and the credibility of the City's witnesses. That the victim 
changed her story and was demonstrably biased in favor of the defendant was observed by the 
jury. Balanced against the testimony of a credible, independent witness, and corroboration by the 
investigating officer and the prior inconsistent statements of the victim, Karen Cadman's changing 
testimony bears little weight. The jury's verdict was well supported by the evidence, and should 
stand. 
For the foregoing reasons the City requests that the jury's verdict be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted this S -^ fl&y of January, 1995. 
Attorney for Respondent 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
11.04.140 
Annotated, and successor sections, or pursuant to a 
criminal summons or any other order of a court, is 
guilty of a Class B misdemeanor, regardless of the 
disposition of die charge upon which the person was 
originally cited. (Ord. 79-88 § 1, 1988) 
Chapter 11.08 
OFFENSES AGAINST THE PERSON 
11.08.010 
11.08.020 
11.08.030 
11.08.040 
11.08.050 
11.08.060 
Assault. 
Battery. 
Telephone harassment. 
Emergency telephone abuse. 
Place of commission of offense 
involving use of telephone. 
Definitions—Crime of 
stalking—Designated. 
11.08.010 Assault. 
An assault is an unlawful attempt, coupled with 
a present ability, to commit a violent injury on the 
person of another. It is unlawful for any person to 
commit an assault within the limits of Salt Lake 
City. (Prior code § 32-1-2) 
11.08.020 Battery. 
A battery is any wilful and unlawful use of force 
or violence upon the person of another. It is unlaw-
ful for any person to commit a battery within the 
limits of the city. (Prior code § 32-1-3) 
11.08.030 Telephone harassment. 
A. A person is guilty of telephone harassment if, 
with intent to annoy or alarm another, he/she: 
1. Makes a telephone call, whether or not a con-
versation ensues, without purpose of lawful commu-
nication, including but not limited to making a call 
or calls and then terminating the call before conver-
sation ensues; or 
2. Makes repeated, unwanted telephone calls at 
extremely inconvenient hours; or 
3. Insults, taunts or challenges another by use 
of telephone communication in a manner likely to 
provoke a violent or disorderly response; or 
4. Telephones another and knowingly makes any 
false statement concerning injury, death, disfigure-
ment, indecent conduct or criminal conduct of the 
person telephoned or any member of his/her family, 
or uses obscene, profane or threatening language 
with intent to terrify, intimidate, harass or annoy. 
The making of a false statement as herein set out 
shall be prima facie evidence of intent to terrify, 
intimidate, harass or annoy. 
B. Telephone harassment is a Class B misde-
meanor. (Ord. 88-86 § 60 (part), 1986: prior code 
§ 32-1-19) 
11.08.040 Emergency telephone abuse. 
A. A person is guilty of emergency telephone 
abuse if such person: 
1. Intentionally refuses to yield or surrender the 
use of a party line or a public pay telephone to 
another person upon being informed that such tele-
phone is needed to report a fire or summon police, 
medical or other aid in case of emergency, unless 
such telephone is likewise being used for an emer-
gency call; or 
2. Asks for or requests the use of a party line or 
a public pay telephone on the pretext that an emer-
gency exists, knowing that no emergency exists. 
B. Emergency telephone abuse is a Class B mis-
demeanor. 
C. For the purposes of subsection A of this sec-
tion: 
1. "Emergency" means a situation in which 
property or human life is in jeopardy and the 
prompt summoning of aid is essential to the preser-
vation of human life or property; 
2. "Party line" means a subscriber's line or tele-
phone circuit consisting of two or more main tele-
phone stations connected therewith, each station 
with a distinctive ring or telephone number. (Ord. 
88-86 § 60 (part), 1986: prior code § 32-1-20) 
(Salt Lake City 12-92) 376 
FIERCE BUTLER. 
Georgia WILLIAM FEW, 
ABR BALDWIN. 
In Convention Monday September 17th 1787. 
Present The States of 
New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Mr. 
Hamilton from New York, New Jersey, Pennsylva-
nia, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina-
South Carolina and Georgia. Resolved, 
That the preceding Constitution be laid before the 
United States in Congress assembled, and that it is 
the Opinion of this Convention, that it should after-
wards be submitted to a Convention of Delegates, 
chosen in each State by the People thereof, under the 
Recommendation of its Legislature, for their Assent 
and Ratification; and that each Convention assenting 
to, and ratifying the Same, should give Notice thereof 
to the United States in Congress assembled. 
Resolved, That it is the Opinion of this Convention, 
that as soon as the Conventions of nine States shall 
have ratified this Constitution, the United States in 
Congress assembled should fix a Day on which Elec-
tors should be appointed by the States which shall 
have ratified the same, and a day on which the Elec-
tors should assemble to vote for the President, and 
the Time and Place for commencing Proceedings un-
der this Constitution. That after such Publication the 
Electors, should be appointed, and the Senators and 
Representatives elected: That the Electors should 
meet on the Day fixed for the Election of the Presi-
dent, and should transmit their Votes certified, 
signed, sealed and directed, as the Constitution re-
quires, to the Secretary of the United States in Con-
gress assembled, that the Senators and Representa-
tives should convene at the Time and Place assigned; 
that the Senators should appoint a President of the 
Senate, for the sole Purpose of receiving, opening and 
counting the Votes for President; and, that after he 
shall be chosen, the Congress, together with the Pres-
ident, should, without Delay, proceed to execute this 
Constitution. 
By the Unanimous Order of the Convention. 
Go. WASHINGTON, Presidt. W. JACKSON, Secretary. 
AMENDMENTS TO THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES 
AMENDMENTS I-X [BILL OF RIGHTS] 
AMENDMENTS XI-XXVII 
AMENDMENT I 
[Religious and political freedom.] 
Congress shall make no law respecting an estab-
lishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the 
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assem-
ble, and to petition the Government for a redress of 
grievances. 
__ -w m^xitur ttnns.J , 
A well-regulated Militia, being necessary to \ 
curity of a free State, the right of the people fc 
and bear Arms, shall not be infringed. 
AMENDMENT i n 
[Quartering soldiers.] 
No Soldier shall, in time of peace, be quarter 
any house, without the consent of the Owner, n 
time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by 
AMENDMENT IV 
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
sons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreaj 
able searches and seizures, shall not be violated, i 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cat 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particula 
describing the place to be searched, and the perm 
or things to be seized. 
AMENDMENT V 
[Criminal actions — Provisions concerning 
Due process of law and just compensate 
clauses.] 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, < 
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentmei 
or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arisin 
in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when ii 
actual service in time of War or public danger; no 
shall any person be subject for the same offence to b< 
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be com 
pelled in any criminal case to be a witness againsi 
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor shall private property 
be taken for public use, without just compensation. 
AMENDMENT VI 
[Rights of accused.] 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy 
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial 
jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall 
have been committed, which district shall have been 
previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of 
the nature and cause of the accusation; to be con-
fronted with the witnesses against him; to have com-
pulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, 
and to have the Assistance of counsel for his defence. 
AMENDMENT VII 
[Trial by jury in civil cases.] 
In Suits at common law, where the value in contro-
versy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by 
jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, 
shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the 
United States, than according to the rules of the com-
mon law. 
AMENDMENT VIII 
[Bail — Punishment] 
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive 
